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The profitability of the South African gold mining industry has long 
been believed to depend on the ready supply of cheap labour, and a large part of 
this labour has always come from IJozambique. Up to 1906 f~iozambique consistently 
supplied over 60 per cent of the mine labour force; in 1926 it was providing 44 
per cent and in 1369 27 per cent was coming from Portuguese territories. (1) The 
importance of I,Iozambique labour is all the more striking when one learns that a 
large percentage of underground work has always been done by Portuguese Africans. 
In 1923 Pedro IIuralha (2) claimed that 80 per cent of rock face working was done 
by Nozambique workers, while many people have referred to the unwillingness of 
Africans from other areas to work underground. ( 3 )  
This labour is obtained under a series of agreements between the 
Portuguese and South African authorities. The first of tnese dates from 1097 
when, for the first time, labour recruiting was put within a legal framework; 
the second is the so-called modus vivendi of 1901; the third is the pIozambique- 
Transvaal Convention of 1909; finally, there is the Convention of 1928 and the 
subsequent adjustments made to it. (4) 
1-Ieanwhile, other industries in South Africa were recruiting l~losambique 
labour, and they were followed in 1908 by the S. Thorn6 cocoa planters. Then, in 
1914, Pbzambique signed an agreement with Rhodesia to allow the recruiting of 
15,000 labourers. Although this number was never reached, the 1936 census in 
Rhodesia showed that 10 per cent of the work force came from IvIozambique. (5) 
Although numbers are hard to estimate, there can have been few years 
since lgOO when less than 100,000 liozambique workers have been abroad under 
contract - and this number is very much below the full total because of the 
illicit emigration that has always taken place. Ikrvin Hamis in 1959 estimated 
the number at nearer 200,000. (6) 
It is well known that the supply of labour is only one aspect of the 
mutual dependence of the economies of South Africa, the Rhodesias and 1,iozambique. 
As r~ell as supplying labour, PIozambique provides port facilities, railways, oil- 
pipelkes, and now hydro-electric power, thereby creating an economic substructure 
which inthtely links the separate areas of south-eastern Africa. However, 
althougk 1,iozambique 'S part in this development has been crucial, she has al~mys 
been a somewhat reluctant partner, and a strong body of opinion, which includes 
some of Portugual's best known colonial statesmen, has strongly opposed the South 
African connection. It is possible that in this tradition of hostility may lie, 
ready to be unezrthed, a new road which Portuguese policy in Africa might fo1lol.r. 
The relationship of labcur migration to Portuguese policy was studied 
in a famous article by I4azvin IIarris in 1959, but he limited himself to the 
southern part of I$ozambique, and it is the aim of this paper to try to place the 
subject in the context of the development of Iliozambique as a whole. 
Labour IYIihmtion and the Economy before 
To a certain extent labour movements in south-eastern Africa are a 
"traditional" feature of the economy. i,;ozambique labom was recruited throughout 
the nineteenth century to build railways, to supply IJatal suga.r plantations and 
to r~orlr in t1:e diamond mines, long before there was any Portuguese administration 
in southern 1-Iozambique and long before there were any gold mines in Johannesburg. 
So populas were the Diamond diggings that the word diaman apparently entered the 
southern iiozambique languages as a word to apply to all mines. (7) 
iarvin Iiarris suggested that the social structure and the comunal 
division of labour among the 'Ihonp encouraged the migration of males in search 
of work. 2ita Ferreira discounted tnis and placed greatest stress on market 
forces and the attraction of relatively hi& wages and the material goods tiney 
could purchse. By 1895, he maintained, sterling currency ~ras already cizuJ.lating 
mong the Thonga and such things as bride-price were often calculated in 
sterling. (8) Ihen the embryo Portuguese administration was set up following the 
defeat 02 G w g  in 1895, labou nigzation tras found to exist on such a 
scale th'tt the administration tried to prohibit it without any success larhatsoever. 
Zurl2ier north the export of labour was equally traditional, but 
followed nore closely the pattern of the Swahili slave-trade. 1;ozambique 
Africans forcibly migrated for cent'mies: ti-zoughout the Indian Ocean, and glayed 
a considerable part in the peopling of Xadagascar and the smaller islands. 
Forced labour mi,gration occurred inland as well, and contractors szpplied slaves 
to the Barotse and I~Iatabele kingdoms and to the Portuguese senhors in the W e s i  
valley. 
There is some evidence that the transition from slave trading to labour 
contracting was a snooth one. Henry Bevinson argued cogently that contract 
labour ~ras recruited throw the traditional slaving contacts and marched to the 
coast bJ- slavers along the old slave trails. In Zambesia, labour contractors 
from 3ritish Central Africa were operating in the 1890s in areas of 1.iozanbiq.ue 
as yet h?,rdly under government control, and were contracting with the prazo 
senhors and captain-majors for labour. (9) One of these, H. Crawford Angus, 
spent five nonths trying to recruit labour in 1895, and recorded that 
The price of slaves averaged about As to 6s eacli, 
and children from 3s to 5s each; the chief market 
is Tete, on the Zambezi, the Portuguese 
headqwrters there, where a ready sale is found 
among the Portq-pese police and servants, and 
among the officers even and other inhabitants. (10) 
The transition vms made all the more smooth by W e s 1  law perpetuating the old 
forns of the prazo system. 
It is arwble, therefore, that the weak and disorganized Portuguese 
colonial adninistration inherited a situation and was forced to regularize m d  
accept an extensive movement of labour which it could not do anything to prevent. 
In fact, so weak was Portugalts position during the 1890s with widespread African 
resistance, bankruptcy at home, and por.rerful and seedy British and German 
neighbours in Africa, that she was forced thankfully to accent any kind of 
settlement that prould stabilize her colony. 
In this light must be seen the heedless gmnting away of half of 
Ebzanbique to t~.ro chartered companies, one of them wholly and the other partly 
foreign owned. The Niassa and Ibzanbique conpanies adopted different tax 
structures, different land laws, different tariffs and different labour practices 
fron the other parts of the territory. 
Tiscal Policy and Transvaal Labour 
In this gloomy pictuse the ~rosperity of Lourengo ikques and its 
hinterland was the one bright spot. In the year 1896-7, out of total receipts 
of 2,934 contos, Lourengo I,Iarques accounted for 1,880 contos; in 1906 the 
proportion bras even more pronounced, with Lourenco I%,rques providing 3,280 contos 
out of total receipts for the colony of A,813 contos. (11) The railway from the 
Rand to Delagoa m was finished in 1894, and with the great expansion of the 
gold mines at the same period there was a readily growing movement of goods and 
labour between Kozambique and the Rand. To encourage these economic links with 
South Africa and vmrm in the golden prosperity of the mines was an obvious policy 
for colonial statesmen faced with an empty exchequer. 
In 1897 labour recruiting was placed under government control in 
southern Pbzambique, and in l9OO a monopoly of labour recruiting was given to 
the T:AIIA. In 1901 a comprehensive agreement was signed with the British 
administration in the Transvaal, vfnich secured considerable economic advantages 
foriiozambique, including a fee on every labourer recruited and a guarantee of 
half the rail freigbt from the coast to the Rand. By subsequent agreements these 
advantages were extended to incluce a repatriation payment and a deferred paynent 
of part of a miner's wages. Attempts made to secure a monopoly of the sale of 
alcohol to the Portuguese African miners were, however, defeated. (12) 
These agreements with South Africa have always provided the Portuguese 
with substantial returns, comfortably visible in the accounts of the colony. 
Apart from the development of the ~ o r t  of Lourengo Ikrques, Freire de Rndmde 
listed the advantages as threefold: hu* taxes were easier to collect and their 
yield rose; African purchasing power was increased and this particularljr 
benefited the Portuguese wine trade; and direct payments on tne labour contracts 
improved sterling balances. (13) 
- 
~t i n  c lear ,  however, that the economic links with South Africa and. 
iZlodesiz, coupled with the frappentation of the colony in the ear ly part  of the 
twentieth century, have led t o  considerable distortions i n  i t s  development. 
i;ozzn'oique, un t i l  1960, was a countr j  of sea-ports and railways. It had a 
developed coastal regi ,n  and bands of developnent along the railways and, t o  a 
lesser  extent, the rivers,  but it had no connunications system linking different  
par ts  of the country. The only b r i d e s  across tine Zambesi Tarere i n  Bri t ish 
te r r i to ry  or  toolc the railway t o  Bri t ish te r r i to ry ,  and up till the present it 
i s  s t i l l  hposs ib le  to  drive from n o r t l ~  i.bzambique t o  south r.rithout crossing 
forner Bri t ish te r r i to ry ,  i,iodern ieiozznbique re f lec ts  i n  i t s  develo.anent the 
role  i t  k s  played as port, tmsit route and labour pool fo r  central and 
soathem Africa. 
Cr i t ics  of tne Labour i*iimation 
Cri t ics  of the labour conventions f e l l  in to  trtro groups. Tine f i r s t  
~TOLI? b r a s  mde up of those who thought tha t  Portugal had not driven a hard 
enough bargain. Tine mines could pay more f o r  t he i r  labour and the worlrers could 
spend noye of t he i r  money i n  IIozambique. Preire  de Andrade contrasted the 516 
contos spent by Africans i n  Johannesburg wi t11  the 187 contos they spent inside 
14ozanbique. 
Associated with tinese argume:lts were those which pointed t o  the 
dem,tiomlization of the Portuguese Africans on the mines. Africans vould learn 
to  respect the e f f ic ien t  and uniformed officers of ;,TTLh and t h i s  would subtly 
undernine Portuguese authority. It i s  no coincidence that  the 1928 Labour Code 
forbade foreign labour contkactors t o  wear uniform l ike  tha t  of tne mil i tary o r  
the police. (15) lke i re  de Andrade elso erpressed concern a t  the anpeamace of 
bibles i n  the luggage of returning Africzns, ttnich indicated missionary influence, 
and recorded with ala.rm tha t  dissident Gaza chiefs were l iv ing  i n  the Transvaal 
out of the reach of Portuguese police. (16) 
The second pou? of c r i t i c s  were the moat important. They maintained 
the, a l t h o u ~ 5  the labour contracts with South Africa and iihoclesia brought i n  
much needed s t e r l i ng  and helped to  balance tile colonial budget, notiling IELS being 
done t o  develop the economy of Iiozanbique i t s e l f .  They argaed tna t  i f  the labour 
used by the South African gold mines were available f o r  domestic emnloyment 
IIozanbique would soon overcome her labour needs and develop a thriving amiculture 
and industry. 
The man whose name is chiefly associated with the ear ly attempts t o  
develop the economy of PIozambique i s  Antonio Ennes. Fie sat on the commission of 
inquiry into the prazos i n  1888; he drew up the prazo l a w  of 1830 and milt out 
as  royal commissioner i n  1892 t o  imlplement it; he s a t  on the colonial commission 
of 1898 which drew up the revised native labour code of 1839. In h i s  book, 
i.Ioganbique, which was f i r s t  published i n  1893, khnes a d m i t s  that there were few 
encouraging signs i n  1892 f o r  anyone rrho wanted to  see i~bzaab iq~e  d velop her 
econow. ITot only were there serious disorders i n  every d i s t r i c t  but there was 
a shortage of funds and v i r tua l ly  no industr ia l  o r  ae;ricultural enterprises i n  
existence except a few coconut and oil-seed plantations and some s t i l l s  f o r  paln 
sp i r i t .  i,Iooreover, the trade of the t e r r i t o ry  was ent i rely i n  Lsian imd3. 
"Portupese comerce", he mote,  i s  a mztter of t i n s  of sardines and t o t s  of 
liquor." (17) 
But Ennes believed that what was needed for the development of Africa 
was the proper organization of labour, not the investment of capital in vast 
mining enterprises. It was the philosophy of a poor country faced with urgent 
development problems, and although the imperialist assumptiomof W e s  now have 
a hollow and unhealthy ring;, the rest of his thought has a great deal of 
relevance to the contemporary problems of Africa. 
Ennes had to plan for a fragmented country. South central Africa was 
not only partitioned among the European imperial powers but iYIozambique itself 
had been disastrously fragmented. The Niassa and Tozambique Company concessions 
were outside government control, while the rest of the colony was divided into 
those areas under the oldprazo system of administration and land tenure and 
those areas directly administered by the government. Even in the government 
areas there were differences, some parts being under civil and some under 
nilitary control, while in some areas a head tax (mussoco) and in other areas a 
hut tax (palhota) was collected from Africans. 
In 1890-92 Ehnes revised the prazo legislation and in 1899 he produced 
a labour code for the areas under direct governmerit control. Ennes' ingenious 
plan for the self-development of the Zambesi valley has been frequently 
described. (18) Briefly, it laid on !the concessionaires the obligation to collect 
half the African head tax in the form of labour and to use this labour to develop 
specified proportions of the prazo. In addition, the concessionaire had to 
administer, police and generally supervise his concession. The prazo thus became 
a plantation supported by a pool of labour among the population of its hinterland. 
Ennes believed that labour services would be popular with Africans and 
that the prazo legislation was strong and definite enough to ensure tht its 
provisions were carried out. 
Under the prazo law the Zambesi valley only developed slotrly. Tne Etrea 
was not pacified until 1902 and then comunication problems made all attempts to 
grow export crops away from the immediate delta area next to impossible. The 
conpanies which rented the prazos in blocks were undercapitalized and ill-equipped 
to carry out their obligations. Throughout much of the area the only financial 
returns the companies could realize were the African head tax payments. The 
arazos \rere sublet to contractors among whom feature some of the slave traders of 
the old regime and these collected the taxes and exploited to the full the fiscal 
privileges of the concessions. (19) 
IJevertheless, some development, did take place near the coast. In l9lL 
it was estimated t b t  there were some 27,584 hectares under cultivation, with one 
and a half million coconut trees, 800,000 rubber trees, 5 million sisal plants, 
and sugar cane producing 25,000 tons of sugar. (20) A list of the major 
agricultural exports of Xozambique in 1915 shows the extent to which tine economy 
was still dependent on forest products and African grown grains and oil-seeds. 
Ln order of magnitude the exports were sugar, groundnuts, copra, whale-oil, 
kaffir-beans, oil-seeds, maize, wax, rubber, mangrove bark, skins and hides, 
lcaffir corn, and ivory. Of these only sugar can really be ascribed to 
systematic economic development. (21) 
The lack of development was laid by the prazo companies firmly at the 
door of labour shortage. If the 100,000 labourers who trekked abroad everjr year 
to South Africa could be made available to FIozambique, then the economy v~ould 
develop. fieire de Andrade gave some sugport to this plea when he listed mong 
the disadvantages of the Transvaal labour migration the resultant hi& price of 
labour. (22) Certainly in the areas directly under government control there was 
no economic development at all. The prazos, however, did not send many servicais 
to tile mines - in 1906 less than 5 per cent of labourers came from Zambezia and 
iTiassa together - so that alleged labour shortage had really to be ascribed to 
other factors. 
It was soon realized that, far from welcoming the provisions of m e s '  
prazo law, Africans were illegally migrating in large numbers to avoid it. So 
serious was the situation reported to be that the secretary for native affairs, 
Castello Bmco, was sent in 1908 to make a report. 
This report, published in 1909, shows the conditions under which fiscal 
labour was being exacted in Zambesia, describes underpayment for work, the 
forcing of Africans to provide their own food, the exacting of unpaid labour, the 
forcing of Africans to accept payment in kind, common housing for girls and men 
on the plantations, corporal punishment, compulsory service in the police, and 
the seizure and imprisonment of hostages. Castello Brancots findings were hotly 
disputed by the prazo companies but they were only reiterating the criticisms 
that had already been made by Freire de Andrade and Car1 liiese - the latter a sub- 
contractor and former slave and ivory trader. (23) All agreed that the emigration 
of L?fricans to British territory or the territory of the Mozambique Company was 
going on at an alarming rate. 
It was the volume of this illegal emigration, coupled with tile failure 
of tne prazos on the upper river to show any development, that probably led the 
Portuguese authorities to allow iihodesia to recruit labourers there on a contract 
basis in 1914. 
Faced by what they believed to be a critical labour shortage, the prazo 
coinpanies reacted by demanding a whole range of reforms. They demanded and 
obtained an extension to their leases; they successfully had the powers of the 
prazo inspectorate abolished and they bombarded the government with demands that 
they should be allowed to recruit servical labour alongside 'JGA and the 
Rhodesian ITative Labour Bureau in government administered territory. A number 
of these contracts were in fact made - Freire de Andrade refers to one when 12 per 
cent of the contracted labourers died and the rest deserted - and the most fmous 
of tliem was the Hornung contract negotiated between Sena Sugar Estates a d  the 
governor-general, Brito Camacho, in 1921. By this contract the government agreed 
to supply 3,000 labourers from the lkgaja da Costa district. (24) 
Portuguese Labour Leaslation 
Early in the twentieth century, therefore, the few areas of I4ozambique 
under direct government adininistration were subject to very heavy labour 
requirements. Contractors from S. Thom6, Rhodesia, South Africa, and from the 
prazos were all demanding labour and ex-pecting the government to supply it. 
However, the government also had labour needs of its own. It had to build roads, 
public buildin@, harbour works, etc., and tlierefore found it essential to 
mobilize every available hand. 
This is the background to M e s t  labour law of 1899. This act, which 
~-ras renewed in 1911: and remained substantially unchanged until 1928, was couched 
in the strong moralistic terms with which all imperial legislation of the period 
was flavoured. Portugal had a civilizing mission and work was the most 
civilizing experience that she had to offer the Africans. The law imposed the 
obli~tion to work on all but the young, the old, the chiefs, and the self- 
employed. Those who would not work could be contracted by the government, and 
if they still refused to work they became liable to correctional labour. The 
labour could be contracted to private firms as well as to public authorities and 
chiefs and officials could assist in the fornine; of the contracts. In addition, 
Africans were all liable to unpaid corvee labour on government public works. (25) 
The full impact of this leg5slation can only be appreciated when it is 
realized that the Portuguese did not consider that ordinary village agricultural 
routines amounted to work. P'Iarvin Harris estimated that only 7 per cent of the 
Africans in the Gaza district would qualify as workers if they merely remained 
in their villages and followei! their traditional way of life. 
The full effect on African society of the excessive labour demands 231d 
the uncontrolled abuses of the prazo system was not really felt until the first 
world war, when, in addition to all the other labour demands, the government 
raised an enormous number of carriers - some 25,000 from Zambesia alone. (26) 
Carrier service was highly unpopular and the exactions of the government and the 
brutal way they were levied led in 1917 to the outbreak of rebellion in &rue 
and Zumbo. 
m e  technically formed part of the IIozambique Comysnyls concession, 
but it had been directly administered by the government since its reconquest in 
1902. It had become a prime area for labour recruitment and Brito Camacho, when 
he toured the area in 1921, freely admitted that the callous and brutal behaviour 
of the administration and its police had been to blame for the rising. (27) 
Little changed immediately after the war, though pressure from the 
League of Nations and such domestic storms as that over the Hornung contract led 
Portugal -dually to reconsider her policies. In 1927 the Niassa Companyts 
charter came to an end and in 1930 the government of Antonio Salazar put an end 
to the razo system and brought Zambesia finally under direct state administration. 
In 192 g- the government began to experiment with the compulsory growing of cotton 
by African farmers. In 1927 cotton constituted ?. per cent of PIozambiquets 
exports, but from this time it began to replace sugar as the major product of the 
territory and in 1956 totalled 26 per cent of all the exports. The system of 
forced cotton growing was only wound up in 1965. Finally, in 1928, came a new 
labour code which, with modifications, was to remain in force until 1962. This 
retained the obligation to work and the forcible contracting of labourers but it 
ended unpaid labour and ended the involvement of officials in labour contracts. 
It also nominally tightened up the supervision of contracts and working conditions. 
r'orced labour was still finding an eloquent defender in 1955 when Silva 
Cunha published his closely argued study of Portuguese labour laws. 
Africans and Labour 
In the final paragraph I want to return to the question oT the 
relationship of Africans and African society to the frenetic demands of white 
colonists for labour. I b w  did Africans respond to these demands and how did they 
influence them? ikmvin Harris thought that originally a number of factors 
influenced the migration of African workers from southern I4ozambique - the labour 
pattern or^  their own society which gave the man a small role in agriculture, tie 
inheritance traditions which left younger sons short, the pressures of Portuguese 
labour laws, and the low wages available in Portuppese employment. Ilita Ferreira 
argued that the tradition of labour migration existed before Portuguese 
adninistration and that it was simply a response to market forces. The only real 
point of disagreement between them which concerns this study is the effect of 
Portuguese labour laws on African migmtion. 
There does appear to be strong evidence for the theory that employment 
on the mines is relatively a very attractive prospect for many ibzambique 
Africans and adpeared so to them before they had m c h  direct experience of 
Portuguese control. In spite of the poor working conditions and hi& death and 
injury rates, very large numbers of workers from southern lozanbique made the 
journey more than once. Freire de Andrade estimated that 50-60 per cent of 
workers returned to the mines, while Sheila van der IIorst says that in 1933 up 
to 95 per cent of I.Zozambique mine workers had had previous experience. (28) 
Pointing in the same direction are two other facts. In the first two decades of 
gold inining 77 per cent of Portuguese African labour came from the three southern 
provinces of Inhambane, Gaza, and Lourengo Nmques and 50 per cent from Gaza 
alone. (29) Yet Gaza remained exceptionally rebellious and free from Portuguese 
control. After the war of conquest in 1895 there was a serious rebellion in 
1897 and disturbances in 1900, 1902, and 1905. On the face of it, therefore, 
there does not seem to be any direct relationship between oppressive labour laws 
m$. enimtion, though the high emigration from Gaza might certainly be a result 
of nilitaqr re~ression and disturbance. The second fact is the high rate of 
illegal emigration which certainly shows Africans anxious to avoid the 
restrictions of the formal contracts, the loss of earnings and freedom, etc., 
but may also indicate a surplus of supply over demand. 
In Zanbesia there is a much closer and more obvious relationship 
between the oppressive labour lam and police methods of the Portuguese and the 
migration of whole populations to British or lbzambique Company territory. 
T;iiese, Beire de Andrade, and above all Castello Branco show the overwhelming 
African resentment at the performance of unpaid labour of any kind, even labour 
in lieu of taxes. Castello Branco gives a number of cases of Africans in a body 
refusing to work for inadequate wages, and he shows unequivocally that the 
Zambesi Africans knew the Ifrate for the job" and would not work beneath it. 
Other grievances are also of a recognizably economic nature. Africans 
in Zambesia were well atme of the restrictive practices of the Frazo companies 
and tne swindling involved in the truck system of payment. !.liese said that a 
major groblem bras the different tariffs that existed in central Africa which made 
goods purchased in British territory much cheaper than those in Portuguese. 
Considerable smuggling took place across the frontier, with the attendant 
diaorders. There was also the difference in tax. The head tax on the prazos 
was not only high in comparison with taxes in British territory but involved 
personal inquiry and assessment by the company police which was resented and led 
to all sorts of abuses. 
On top of these economic complaints were the more personal ones: 
corporal punishment, the taking of hostages and burning of kraals to enforce 
payment, compulsory service in the police, but above all the ceaseless denands 
for labour and more labour. Brito Camacho said thzt in Bane the Africans used 
to say that monkeys did not talk or live in houses like humans because they were 
afraid of having to do forced labour for the Portuguese. 
In Zanbesia African resentment at the system led not only to cowlaints 
but to rebellion, to evasion of every kind, and to migration. 
Conclusions 
a) The export of labour to South Africa was a policy which the Portuguese 
pvernnent had no option but to accept. 
b) Excessive labour demands were localized in areas under direct 
government control. This led to a complete failure to achieve economic 
development in those areas and, in Bane, to serious rebellion. 
c) The prazo system, which m s  an imaginative attempt to develop 
I~iozambique~s own potential, failed largely through maladministration and the 
flight of Africans to the relatively better prospects and conditions in British 
territory - a fact which materially contributed to the decision to allow Rhodesia 
to recruit labour under contract in 1914. 
d) The view eqressed by many writers, and by Silva Cunha for the 
Portuguese as late as 1955, that Africans would not work and did not respond to 
wage incentives is not borne out by the facts. At an early period Africans 
shorred an acute appreciation of the state of the market and for labour and for 
goods. 
e) By refusing to offer their services and by illegally emigrating, 
Africans materially influenced the development of Nozambique and the policy of 
the Portuguese. 
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